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• Wemodel the determinants of banking crises using a new country-level panel database.
• We allow for the interaction of capital surges, credit booms and financial fragility.
• Booms increase the likelihood of crises only in relatively fragile financial systems.
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a b s t r a c t
Using a new country-level panel database, we explore effect of capital inflow surges, credit booms and
financial fragility on the probability of banking crises. We find that booms increase the probability of a
crisis only in relatively fragile financial systems.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Rapid growth in bank lending could exacerbate the moral haz-
ard and adverse selection problems that undermine the stability
of the banking system, increasing the probability of a banking cri-
sis (Schularick and Taylor, 2012). There is similar concern about
rapid growth in foreign capital inflows, which could fuel excessive
growth in lending or generate asset price bubbles (Calvo, 2012).
Caballero (forthcoming) finds that both capital inflow ‘surges’ and
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credit boomsmake a crisis significantlymore likely.We extend the
existing literature by fitting a model that combines the effects of
booms, surges and financial fragility. Themodel also allows for per-
sistence in crises.
2. Data
Our baselinemodel estimates the probability of a banking crisis
in year t conditional on credit booms, capital inflow surges, and
banking system fragility in year t − 1. The dependent variable,
crisis(i, t), is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2013): it equals one
if there is a banking crisis in country i in year t , and zero otherwise.2
Our credit boom and capital inflow surge variables are
based on the method of Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) and
2 Omitting Laeven and Valencia’s ‘borderline’ cases makes no substantial
difference to our results.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.041
0165-1765/© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Table 1
Dynamic panel probit coefficient estimates for P(crisis(i, t)) = 1 (Baseline model).
A B C
IDFF data (i): N = 1011a coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e.
crisis(i, t − 1) 3.942 9.83 0.183 3.909 10.14 0.191
credit-boom(i, t − 1) 0.778 3.31 0.036 0.809 3.51 0.040
FDI-surge(i, t − 1) 0.564 2.17 0.026 0.541 2.13 0.026
return(i, t − 1) −0.198 −2.63 −0.009 −0.239 −3.21 −0.012
z-score(i, t − 1) −0.042 −1.19 −0.002
IDFF data (ii): N = 1346a coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e.
crisis(i, t − 1) 3.941 11.01 0.169 4.169 11.82 0.195 3.912 11.16 0.170
credit-boom(i, t − 1) 0.939 4.29 0.040 0.953 4.56 0.045 0.940 4.31 0.041
FDI-surge(i, t − 1) 0.417 1.88 0.018 0.352 1.66 0.016 0.436 1.98 0.019
return(i, t − 1) −0.154 −2.13 −0.007 −0.158 −2.25 −0.007
z-score(i, t − 1) 0.015 0.70 0.001 0.000 0.00 0.000
GFDD data: N = 1210 coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e.
crisis(i, t − 1) 3.872 10.27 0.161 4.159 11.35 0.189 3.823 10.66 0.166
credit-boom(i, t − 1) 0.877 3.73 0.036 0.863 3.92 0.039 0.916 4.02 0.040
FDI-surge(i, t − 1) 0.408 1.69 0.017 0.391 1.71 0.018 0.390 1.65 0.017
return(i, t − 1) −0.222 −2.38 −0.009 −0.178 −2.12 −0.008
z-score(i, t − 1) 0.046 1.39 0.002 0.024 0.82 0.001
a ‘IDFF data (i)’ indicates estimates with the least inclusive IDFF measure of returns, and ‘IDFF data (ii)’ estimates with the most inclusive measure.
Caballero (forthcoming). Using a filter, we fit trend values of
(i) real per capita credit to the private sector and (ii) real per
capita gross foreign direct investment inflows for each country.
Credit-boom(i, t) [FDI-surge(i, t)] equals one when de-trended
credit [FDI] is over one standard deviation above zero, and equals
zero otherwise. Using broader measures of capital inflows and
larger standard deviation cut-off points produces results similar to
those reported below.
Our fragility variables come from two alternative sources: the
International Database on Financial Fragility (IDFF; Andrianova
et al., 2015), and the Global Financial Development Database
(GFDD; Čihák et al., 2012). These two databases include the same
country-level fragility measures constructed from bank-level data,
but differ in the selection rules used to determine whether an
individual bank is included in the aggregate. For some variables,
the IDFF reports alternative measures based on selection rules of
varying degrees of inclusiveness. The IDFF data are based on a
somewhat wider range of financial institutions than are the GFDD
data.
We use two alternative variables that are inversely related to
fragility. The first of these is a z-score aggregating asset returns and
equity:
z-score (i, t) =
return (i, t)+ equity (i, t) /assets (i, t)
σ (i)
. (1)
Here, equity(i, t) is the total value of bank equity in country i in
year t , assets(i, t) is the total value of bank assets, return(i, t) is a
weighted average of the banks’ annual return on these assets, and
σ(i) is the standard deviation of return(i, t) over time. This z-score
is a country-level analogue of the z-score of an individual bank
(Laeven and Levine, 2009), andmeasures the distance of the whole
banking system from insolvency under the assumption that bank
profits are normally distributed.
Note that in Laeven and Valencia (2013), insolvency is a
sufficient but not necessary condition for the presence of a crisis:
a crisis can also occur when there are bank runs that do not lead to
insolvency.Moreover, bank runsmight be triggered evenwhen the
banking system is still a long way from insolvency: for example,
runs might be triggered by an expectation of a government
intervention that freezes bank deposits. Such expectations might
be raised simply by a poorly performing banking sector, and
for this reason we include return(i, t) as a second inverse-
fragility measure. Since the IDFF includes alternative estimates
of return(i, t), we fit three alternative versions of our model: (i)
using the IDFF estimates of z-score(i, t) and their least inclusive
estimates of return(i, t), (ii) using the IDFF estimates of z-score(i, t)
and their most inclusive estimates of return(i, t), and (iii) using the
GFDD estimates of z-score(i, t) and return(i, t).
3. The model
Wehave an unbalanced panel of 121 countries over 1999–2011.
The number of missing observations depends on which fragility
data are used, and the total sample size varies between 956 and
1346 observations. Appendix A includes the list of countries and
descriptive statistics for the sample. In order to allow for the
persistence of crisis(i, t)we fit a dynamic Probit model. The fixed-
effects specification of the baseline model is:
P(crisis(i, t) = 1) = Φ(y(i, t))
y(i, t) = αi + δt + β · crisis(i, t − 1)
+Σjϕj · zj(i, t − 1)+ ε(i, t).
(2)
Here, Φ(.) is the cumulative normal density function, zj ∈
{credit-boom, FDI-boom, return, Z-score}, and ε(i, t) is an error
term. Although there is no consistent estimator for this model,
the coefficients in Eq. (2) can be estimated consistently using
the following random-effects specification of the latent variable y
(Wooldridge, 2005):
y(i, t) = ζ (i)+ δt + β · crisis(i, t − 1)+Σjϕj · zj(i, t − 1)
+ γ · crisis(i, 0)+Σjθj · zj(i)+ ε(i, t). (3)
Here, ζ (i) is a normally distributed random effect and zj(i) is the
mean of zj(i, t) over time.
Panel A of Table 1 includes estimates of the β and ϕ coefficients
in Eqs. (2)–(3), along with the corresponding t-ratios andmarginal
effects evaluated at the mean value of Φ (which is 0.09). There
are three sets of estimates corresponding to the three alternative
fragility measures: (i) IDFF using the least inclusive measure of
returns, (ii) IDFF using the most inclusive measure of returns, and
(iii) GFDD. It can be seen from panel A that the coefficient on
z-score is never significantly different from zero, and panels B and
C of Table 1 show coefficient estimates when either one or other
of the fragility variables (z-score or return) is excluded from the
model.3In no case does the exclusion of either variable make a
3 In panel B (which shows results excluding return) there are only two sets of
estimates, because the IDFF reports only one measure of z-score.
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Table 2
Dynamic panel probit coefficient estimates for P(crisis(i, t)) = 1 (Model with extra controls).
A B C
IDFF data (i): N = 956a coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e.
crisis(i, t − 1) 3.983 7.77 0.138 4.118 8.32 0.153
credit-boom(i, t − 1) 0.706 2.15 0.025 0.788 2.50 0.029
FDI-surge(i, t − 1) 0.408 1.25 0.014 0.431 1.36 0.016
return(i, t − 1) −0.276 −2.62 −0.010 −0.316 −3.15 −0.012
z-score(i, t − 1) −0.037 −0.75 −0.001
IDFF data (ii): N = 1162a coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e.
crisis(i, t − 1) 3.989 8.97 0.139 3.916 9.52 0.145 3.980 9.21 0.141
credit-boom(i, t − 1) 0.813 2.72 0.028 0.776 2.78 0.029 0.842 2.87 0.030
FDI-surge(i, t − 1) 0.327 1.12 0.011 0.243 0.86 0.009 0.356 1.22 0.013
return(i, t − 1) −0.248 −2.59 −0.009 −0.242 −2.73 −0.009
z-score(i, t − 1) 0.024 0.69 0.001 −0.019 −0.52 −0.001
GFDD data: N = 1072 coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e.
crisis(i, t − 1) 4.075 8.04 0.122 4.129 9.10 0.131 3.962 8.71 0.134
credit-boom(i, t − 1) 0.568 1.70 0.017 0.610 2.63 0.019 0.701 2.26 0.024
FDI-surge(i, t − 1) 0.314 0.93 0.009 0.313 0.98 0.010 0.323 1.00 0.011
return(i, t − 1) −0.317 −2.51 −0.010 −0.229 −2.15 −0.008
z-score(i, t − 1) 0.091 1.78 0.003 0.037 1.20 0.001
a ‘IDFF data (i)’ indicates estimates with the least inclusive IDFF measure of returns, and ‘IDFF data (ii)’ estimates with the most inclusive measure.
Table 3
Models with interaction terms.
Baseline model Extra controls
IDFF data (i)a coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e.
crisis(i, t − 1) 4.247 9.30 0.193 5.269 6.54 0.153
credit-boom(i, t − 1) 1.101 3.81 0.050 1.697 3.22 0.049
FDI-surge(i, t − 1) 0.682 2.51 0.031 0.729 1.87 0.021
return(i, t − 1) ∗ I(credit-boom(i, t − 1) = 1) −0.415 −2.97 −0.019 −0.705 −3.50 −0.021
return(i, t − 1) ∗ I(credit-boom(i, t − 1) = 0) −0.151 −1.57 −0.007 −0.119 −0.81 −0.003
Difference in return effects −0.264 −1.58 −0.586 −2.40
IDFF data (ii)a coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e.
crisis(i, t − 1) 4.071 10.57 0.169 4.407 8.35 0.141
credit-boom(i, t − 1) 1.186 4.41 0.049 1.136 3.06 0.036
FDI-surge(i, t − 1) 0.518 2.27 0.021 0.541 1.72 0.017
return(i, t − 1) ∗ I(credit-boom(i, t − 1) = 1) −0.314 −2.32 −0.013 −0.538 −2.97 −0.017
return(i, t − 1) ∗ I(credit-boom(i, t − 1) = 0) −0.082 −0.98 −0.003 −0.162 −1.53 −0.005
Difference in return effects −0.232 −1.50 −0.376 −1.90
GFDD data coeff. t-ratio m.e. coeff. t-ratio m.e.
crisis(i, t − 1) 3.880 10.46 0.164 4.146 8.28 0.131
credit-boom(i, t − 1) 0.847 2.97 0.036 0.688 1.80 0.022
FDI-surge(i, t − 1) 0.406 1.70 0.017 0.443 1.31 0.014
return(i, t − 1) ∗ I(credit-boom(i, t − 1) = 1) −0.091 −0.70 −0.004 −0.160 −0.98 −0.005
return(i, t − 1) ∗ I(credit-boom(i, t − 1) = 0) −0.200 −2.07 −0.008 −0.220 −1.86 −0.007
Difference in return effects 0.109 0.74 0.060 0.34
a ‘IDFF data (i)’ indicates estimates with the least inclusive IDFF measure of returns, and ‘IDFF data (ii)’ estimates with the most inclusive measure.
substantial difference to any of the other coefficient estimates.
The results across the three different fragility measures are very
similar.
The insignificance of z-score suggests that the country-level
distance from insolvency is not itself a predictor of banking crises;
one interpretation of this result is that crises can be triggered
long before a country gets close to insolvency. By contrast, return
is significant at the 5% level in all of the Table 1 estimates. The
marginal effect on return is about −0.01: in other words, a one
percentage point increase in average returns on assets will reduce
the probability of a crisis by about one percentage point, i.e. from
0.09 to 0.08 at the mean. In order to interpret the magnitude of
this effect, note that the standard deviation of return is just over
1.5 percentage points.
There is also a significant coefficient on credit-boom. The esti-
mated marginal effect implies that on average, a credit boom in-
creases the probability of a crisis by about four percentage points.
The coefficient on FDI-surge is somewhat smaller, and the corre-
sponding marginal effect implies that on average, an FDI surge
increases the probability of a crisis by about two percentage
points.
Table 1 shows that there is a high level of persistence in the data.
The estimated marginal effect on the lagged dependent variable
ranges from 0.16 to 0.19. This implies that at themean (Φ = 0.09),
the presence of a crisis in the previous year triples the probability
of a crisis in the current year. If the lagged dependent variable is
excluded from the model, then the resulting coefficient estimate
on credit-boom is about 25% larger and the coefficient estimate
on return is about twice as large. In other words, neglecting
the persistence in the crisis data will lead to substantial over-
estimation of other effects.
Table 2 reports the results of adding some additional macroe-
conomic control variables to the right-hand side of Eqs. (2)–(3).
The addition of these variables (listed in Appendix A) makes
no substantial difference to the estimated coefficients on return,
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Fig. 1. Credit boom effects with 95% confidence intervals for different levels of
percentage returns.
credit-boom or lagged crisis. However, the estimated size of the
FDI-surge coefficient does fall, and this coefficient is no longer sig-
nificantly different from zero at the 10% level.4
In Eqs. (2)–(3), the effects of surges, booms and fragility are
assumed to be linearly separable. It is also possible that the effect
of surges and booms varies according to the level of returns: a
high level of returns may reflect a more robust banking system
which can withstand any moral hazard or adverse selection
effects attending a surge or boom. The results in Table 3 show
some evidence for a significant interaction between the effect
of returns and the effect of credit booms. These results are
from a model that replaces returns(i, t − 1) with [returns(i, t −
1) × I(credit-boom(i, t − 1) = 1)] and [returns(i, t − 1) ×
I(credit-boom(i, t−1) = 0)]. The table records both the estimated
coefficients on these variables and the difference between them.
This difference is not significant in all cases, but it is significant
at the 2% level in the model using the least inclusive IDFF data
and themacroeconomic control variables. (This is the specification
that produces the best fit according to a pseudo-R2 statistic.) Here,
the coefficient estimates imply that the effect of returns on the
probability of a crisis is small and statistically insignificant in the
absence of a credit boom, but large and statistically significant in
4 Nevertheless, as shown in Caballero (forthcoming), capital inflow surges are
significant predictors of crises in models fitted to longer sample periods (but
without the fragility variables for which early data are lacking).
the presence of a boom. To put it another way, a higher level of
returns mitigates the effect of a boom. This is illustrated in Fig. 1,
which shows the implicit credit boom coefficient (not themarginal
effect) for different values of returns, using the model fitted with
the least inclusive IDFF data. Credit booms make a crisis more
likely as long as returns are below about 1.5 percentage points, but
have no significant effect at higher levels of returns. Adding similar
interaction terms with FDI-surge does not produce any significant
coefficient estimates, so these results are not shown.
4. Discussion
Both financial fragility (as captured by the poor financial per-
formance of banks) and credit booms are important determinants
of the probability of a banking crisis, although their effect might
be somewhat overstated in estimates that do not allow for persis-
tence in crises.Moreover, it seems to be the combination of fragility
with a boom that creates the conditions for a crisis: in the model
that fits our data the best, neither booms alone nor fragility alone
make a significant difference to the probability of a crisis. As a rule
of thumb, if the annual average return on bank assets is greater
than 1.5% then large fluctuations in liquidity should not endanger
the banking system. To put this figure in context, in our sample,5
themean annual return for Canadian banks (excluding the atypical
year of 2008) is 2.3%, compared with 0.9% for US banks and−0.5%
for Greek ones. Credit booms should be less of a concern in Canada
than in countries such as Greece and the United States.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary material related to this article can be found
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.09.041.
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